Homeland Security and Intelligence, 2nd Edition by Logan Keith Gregory;

Author:Logan, Keith Gregory;
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
ISBN: 7041933
Publisher: ABC-CLIO, LLC

Overcoming Challenges

It has been 10 years since the Fusion Center Guidelines were first published, but the passage of a decade has not meant that all of the problems of an information-sharing organization have been worked out. Early in the creation of the document, law enforcement, public safety, and private sector leaders were urged to move forward with adopting fusion centers as the new paradigm needed to exchange information and intelligence to combat terrorism.27 Yet, a decade later, the perception of what the role of fusion centers should be—both locally and nationally—remains distorted. This garbled view of fusion centers can be attributed to the decentralized nature of these enterprises in which individual law enforcement or homeland security organizations fund, direct, and manage day-to-day operations. Coupled with this unique dynamic is the role that both the DHS and the FBI play in supporting, evaluating, and financing fusion centers. The individualized information-sharing and intelligence needs of fusion center customers, that are dependent on their own localized or regional concerns, continue to obscure a one-size-fits-all template for fusion centers. Regrettably, the perception of the role of fusion centers is often left to the “eye of the beholder.”

Today, there is still confusion over who actually owns fusion centers. For example, a Washington Post headline in 2012 began with the following: “DHS fusion centers portrayed . . .”28 In November 2013, the New American published an article entitled “DHS Creates New Fusion Centers, Taking Control of Local Police.” In April of 2016, the New York Times sued the government for records on “DHS-funded” fusion centers. This muddled view of fusion centers is not just fueled by the media. The Congressional Research Service report entitled Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, published in 2008, focused its attention squarely on the value proposition that fusion centers could provide for the DHS in the advancement of homeland security. Additionally, the United States Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Committee of Homeland Security & Government Affairs) report painted fusion centers as relying on hundreds of millions of taxpayers’ dollars to achieve federal centric objectives.29 Moreover, the DHS reference to the “national network of fusion centers” on their official website can also be mistaken by some who may think that fusion centers are independent organizations separate from their state or local host agencies.30 In reality, these centers, which are spread out across the country, are components of law enforcement or homeland security organizations similar to a police department having a narcotics bureau. This misperception greatly impacts public perception, government perception, and how fusion centers often see themselves.

This inability to market a nationally understood identity often results in issues with resourcing and access to information; the latter is the currency needed to operate fusion centers effectively to accomplish their mission of intelligence analysis. However, despite the federal government’s ISE, which was established by the IRTPA of 2004, similar structures throughout the various state and local jurisdictions do not generally exist. This makes it difficult, burdensome, and sometimes impossible for fusion centers to gain access to the information they may need to conduct threat analysis and risk assessments.

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